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The European Parliament’s political groups: between high 
cohesion and recurrent breakdowns 
 
Lorenzo Cicchi 
The political groups in the European Parliament (EP) have been generally described as cohesive actors: 
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the same political group are likely to vote together, 
regardless of their nationality. Based on his recently published book on MEPs’ voting behaviour, Lorenzo 
Cicchi analyses those roll-call votes where political groups of the European Parliament (EPGs) are 
exceptionally divided, reaching partially counter-intuitive results. He argues that what is generally overlooked 
is that the high levels of party cohesion in the EP may be a ‘statistical artefact’, in the sense that a substantial 
number of divisive votes are drowned out by a large majority of votes where party groups are highly or 
almost completely cohesive.  
 
Over the past thirty years, one of the most 
remarkable democratic developments in 
Europe has been the gradual empowerment of 
the EP, the only directly elected supranational 
legislative chamber in the world. From its first 
gathering in 1952 as the Common Assembly 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
in its sixty-year history the EP has evolved 
from a mere consultative body into a full-
fledged legislative chamber. Consequently, 
understanding the decisions of the EP on 
legislative proposals has become more and 
more important for explaining the legislative 
production of the EU.  
Interest in the general question ‘how do MEPs 
vote?’ has attracted increasing academic 
attention since the early 1980s, following the 
first direct elections to the EP. From that 
point on, a consolidated stream of literature, 
relying mainly on quantitative analyses of 
recorded roll-call votes (RCVs), has treated 
EPGs as highly cohesive actors and described 
voting patterns as almost exclusively defined 
by the left-right cleavage. 
However, when discussing party-group 
cohesion in the European Parliament, existing 
studies usually look at numerical indexes of 
cohesion (such as the Agreement Index, AI) 
and presents the scores calculated not for the 
single vote, but aggregated over a certain time 
span. I argue that this may lead to the 
underestimation of some of the EP’s internal 
dynamics. In other words, a high average 
cohesion of European political groups may be 
the result of every vote where EPGs are 
highly cohesive, or the result of a large 
number of votes where EPGs are completely 
united and a minority of votes where EPGs 
are completely divided.  
Are EPGs always cohesive or do they break down 
from time to time? 
A useful exercise, in order to assess the 
effective cohesion of EPGs and to give a brief 
idea of the complexity of voting behaviour of 
MEPs, is to look at the statistical outliers of 
EPGs’ cohesiveness. An outlier in Agreement 
Index scores represents a vote where EPG 
cohesion deviates markedly from the general 
cohesion. In the first 4684 roll-call votes cast 
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in the last completed 7th legislature of the EP 
(2009–2014), my analysis shows that there 
were 1433 outliers. This means that, on 
average, for every 3.2 cast there was one vote 
where at least one EPG was so divided to be 
considered a statistical outlier. Taking into 
account the high number of votes cast in a 
single plenary session, this means that there 
was no plenary where all EPGs were cohesive 
on every vote. 




As it can be seen in Figure 1, the variation 
between groups shows that Euro-sceptic 
groups and non-attached members are 
generally quite divided EPGs, while the other, 
bigger, and generally more pro-EU groups 
tend to be much more cohesive, as most of 
the literature acknowledges. This is partially 
disconfirmed by the group of European 
Conservatives and Reformists, which despite 
its ‘Euro-realism’ shows highly cohesive 
parliamentary behaviour. What my outlier 
analysis highlights is the fact that even if this 
high cohesion reflects the great majority of 
votes where EPGs are completely cohesive 
(because, in practice, all their members vote 
in the same way), there is a significant 
minority of votes where they are completely 
divided, showing AI scores close to 0. This 
pattern strikes one as quite surprising: even 
the mainstream, more organised, pro-EU 
political groups can bluntly fail to discipline 
their members, letting them vote in a way that 
makes the group perfectly divided. So, it can 
be misleading to look only at the mean 
cohesion of EPGs, because it does not 
illustrate the distribution or the standard 
deviation, thus giving the impression that all 
the votes have AI scores close to this value, 
without substantial variance. By contrast, to 
have a more comprehensive knowledge of 
MEPs’ voting behaviour, it is important to 
bear in mind that EPGs’ high cohesiveness is 
the result of almost all votes where EPGs are 
voting harmoniously together, but a few 
where they completely fail to be cohesive. 
Common Agriculture Policy reform: more 
breakdowns than ever 
My analysis also shows that three groups 
(Liberals, Socialists & Democrats and 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left) 
have in common a particularly evident 
negative peak of the Agreement Index during 
the 7th legislature.  
Figure 2. General trend and outliers in S&D 
cohesion, 7th legislature 
 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 2, relative to the 
S&D group alone, this peak lasts for a short 
period of time/votes, after which cohesion 
scores return to ‘normality’. The interesting 
element is that all three groups share the 
same lack of cohesion at the same time, 
leading alternatively to an abnormal rise of 
outliers. An in-depth analysis of these votes 
show that all these uncommonly dividing 
votes refer to the same issue: CAP reform. 
CAP reform, as already widely recognised by 
EU practitioners and experts, albeit less so by 
the academic literature, has witnessed 
different voting patterns than those defined by 
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the left-right cleavage. Here, nationality-based 
divisions are more likely to emerge (e.g. MEPs 
from the same country voting together, 
regardless of EPG membership), therefore 
leading to extremely low party cohesion. 
Moreover, existing studies usually look at the 
final vote that takes place in the plenary 
session, where the divisions and contrasts 
have in fact usually been resolved. By looking 
at the previous votes too, however, the 
picture changes substantially: EPGs can be 
extremely divided for a long series of votes, 
before returning to the “usual” cohesion.  
The European Parliament’s internal dynamics: 
EPGs’ centrality, ‘revised’ 
European political groups are certainly the 
‘internal political engine’ of the Parliament, 
and most of its daily work revolves around 
them. The importance of political groups has 
been evident since the very beginning of the 
EP’s history, so their centrality should not be 
dismissed. But this does not mean that their 
members cannot decide, from time to time, to 
vote along patterns that completely break 
(such as outcomes of CAP reforms) their 
unity as political groups. And since, as most of 
the scholars acknowledge, European political 
groups (or even more, political parties at the 
EU level from outside the EP) have very little 
power to ‘whip’ them, their election being 
ultimately in the hand of the national parties, 
no consequences arise from these ‘rebellious 
votes’. The reason of such understatement is 
based on a perspective that looks only at the 
mathematic mean of EPG cohesiveness over 
five years, but does not deepen the analysis to 
what really happens if these statistical indexes 
are disaggregated. 
It is worth stressing, however, that this 
analysis does not render any claims of causal 
effects. Rather, the substantive goal is to show 
that EPGs’ high cohesiveness is actually the 
result of the combination of (frequent) 
complete cohesion and (rare) complete 
division, instead of the sheer consequence of 
systematic high cohesion. From a 
methodological point of view, this reinforces 
the already existing claims by some authors 
circa the explanatory risks of aggregate-level 
analyses on voting behaviour. 
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